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KEEPING THE CLEAN WATER ACT COOPERATIVELY
FEDERAL—OR, WHY THE CLEAN WATER ACT DOES
NOT DIRECTLY REGULATE GROUNDWATER POLLUTION
DAMIEN SCHIFF*

INTRODUCTION
The Clean Water Act1 is the leading federal environmental law
regulating water pollution.2 In recent years, its scope and application to
normal land-use activities have become extremely contentious.3 Yet,
despite the growing controversy, the environmental community continues to try to extend the Act’s reach.4 One of its most recent efforts has
focused on expanding the Act to groundwater pollution.5 In this Article
*

Senior Attorney, Pacific Legal Foundation.
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1388. The Act’s formal title is the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972. See Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 1, 86 Stat. 816 (Oct. 18, 1972).
2
See, e.g., Paul Boudreaux, Federalism and the Contrivances of Public Law, 77 ST. JOHN’S
L. REV. 523, 544 (2003) (“[T]he Clean Water Act has been a major feature of water law
for thirty years.”).
3
See, e.g., U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1807, 1816 (2016)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[B]ased on the Government’s representations in this case, the
reach and systemic consequences of the Clean Water Act remain a cause for concern.”);
Sackett v. EPA, 566 U.S. 120, 132 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (“The reach of the Clean
Water Act is notoriously unclear. Any piece of land that is wet at least part of the year
is in danger of being classified . . . as wetlands covered by the Act . . . .”). The United
States Environmental Protection Agency and the United States Army Corps of Engineers,
the agencies that jointly administer the Act, have earned a reputation for reading their
Clean Water Act authority expansively. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 722
(2006) (plurality op.) (“[An] immense expansion of federal regulation of land use . . . has
occurred under the Clean Water Act—without any change in the governing statute—
during the past five Presidential administrations.”)
4
Indeed, one could argue that these controversies have actually emboldened the environmental community to step up its efforts to expand the Act’s reach. See, e.g., Michael C.
Blumm & Steven M. Thiel, (Ground)waters of the United States: Unlawfully Excluding
Tributary Groundwater from Clean Water Act Jurisdiction, 46 ENVTL. L. 333 (2016) (arguing that the controversial “Waters of the United States” rule—controversial because of
its widely perceived overreach—did not regulate far enough).
5
Notably, all of the cases discussed in this Article that have upheld direct Clean Water
Act regulation over groundwater were citizen suits brought by environmental groups
against private companies or local governments.
1
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I aim to show that this environmentalist endeavor is legally wrongheaded.6
The Clean Water Act was passed to restore “the Nation’s waters.”7
The Act’s principal prohibition focuses on a subset of those waters—
namely, “navigable waters” or “waters of the United States.”8 This prohibition, as well as the Act’s other proscriptions and mandates, operates
within a framework of cooperative federalism.9 That framework is evidenced in part by how the Act chooses to regulate pollution that reaches
regulated waters.10
6

Whether it is also ill-advised policy I do not address, although there is significant scholarship supporting a policy presumption that the environment would do better by less, not
more, federal regulation. See Jonathan H. Adler & Andrew P. Morriss, Introduction, 58
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 575, 576 (2008) (“Today there is widespread dissatisfaction with many
aspects of federal environmental law.”); Roger Meiners & Bruce Yandle, Common Law and
the Conceit of Modern Environmental Policy, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 923, 925 (1999) (“[M]ost
federal pollution control efforts are fundamentally misguided. The common law, combined
with various state-level controls, was doing a better job addressing most environmental
problems than the federal monopoly, which directed most environmental policy for the last
part of this century. America’s move down the track of central environmental planning is incompatible with . . . environmental protection itself.”); Jonathan H. Adler, Conservative
Principles for Environmental Reform, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 253, 278–80 (2013) (contending that “environmental protection efforts would benefit from greater decentralization”
because (i) “most environmental problems are local or regional in nature,” (ii) it “creates the
opportunity for greater innovation in environmental policy,” and (iii) the federal government
could then focus “on those environmental concerns where a federal role is easiest to justify,
such as in supporting scientific research and addressing interstate spillovers.”); William W.
Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1556 (2007) (“The common law system’s independence and private incentives to challenge the status quo are particularly valuable antidotes to complacency and
ineffective regulation.”), quoted in Adler & Morriss, supra, at 577 n.15.
7
See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
8
See id. § 1311(a) (prohibiting the unpermitted discharge of pollutants); id. § 1362(12)(A)
(defining “discharge of pollutants” as “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters
from any point source”); id. § 1362(7) (defining “navigable waters” to include “the waters
of the United States”).
9
See Ark. v. Okla., 503 U.S. 91, 101 (1992) (“The Clean Water Act anticipates a partnership between the States and the Federal Government . . . .”). At least one prominent
observer contends that the partnership is nevertheless heavily weighted in favor of federal
authority. See, e.g., Oliver A. Houck, Cooperative Federalism, Nutrients, and the Clean Water
Act: Three Cases Revisited, 44 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10426, 10428–29 (2014)
[hereinafter Houck, Cooperative Federalism]. The characterization, however, is based on
the Act’s treatment of point source pollution, see id. at 10428, which bears little on the
congressional decision to allow the states to maintain the leading role in controlling nonpoint source pollution, including—as discussed infra Part II—groundwater pollution.
10
It is also demonstrated by the Act’s authorization for the transfer of federal permitting
authority to the states. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(b), 1344(g). See New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992) (identifying as part of a program of cooperative federalism the
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Pollution conveyed to regulated waters by a “point source,” i.e.,
any “discernible, confined and discrete conveyance,”11 the Act directly
regulates.12 Pollution conveyed to those waters by something other than
a point source, i.e., a “nonpoint source,” the Act largely leaves to the states
to address.13 This division of responsibility reflects a legislative understanding that “nationwide uniformity in controlling non-point source pollution [is] virtually impossible,” as well as that “the control of non-point
source pollution often depends on land use controls, which are traditionally state or local in nature.”14 Put another way, the Act’s election not to
regulate all sources of pollution—or for that matter all waters of the
nation—is rooted in the traditional congressional “reluctance . . . to allow
extensive federal intrusion into areas of regulation that might implicate
land and water uses in individual states.”15
Extending the Act to directly regulate any pollutant discharges
to groundwater would compromise this statutory division of labor.16
Congress carefully distinguished throughout the Act between “navigable
congressional practice of “offer[ing] States the choice of regulating [an] activity according
to federal standards or having state law pre-empted by federal regulation”).
11
33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
12
See id. § 1311(a).
13
Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351, 1373 (4th Cir. 1976) (“Congress consciously distinguished between point source and nonpoint source discharges, giving EPA
authority under the Act to regulate only the former.”). This is not to say that the Act is
indifferent to nonpoint source pollution, but rather that the Act does not directly regulate
it. Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he Act ‘provides no
direct mechanism to control nonpoint source pollution but rather uses the “threat and
promise” of federal grants to the states to accomplish this task’ . . . .”) (quoting Or. Nat.
Desert Ass’n v. Dombeck, 172 F.3d 1092, 1097 (9th Cir. 1998)).
14
Or. Nat. Desert Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 550 F.3d 778, 785 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Marc
R. Poirier, Non-point Source Pollution, in ENVTL L. PRACTICE GUIDE § 18.13 (2008)).
15
Robert W. Adler, The Two Lost Books in the Water Quality Trilogy: The Elusive Objectives
of Physical and Biological Integrity, 33 ENVTL. L. 29, 56 (2003), quoted in Or. Nat. Desert
Ass’n, 550 F.3d at 785. Cf. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001) (rejecting an interpretation of the Clean Water Act that
“would result in a significant impingement of the States’ traditional and primary power
over land and water use”); Lawrence Ng, Note, A DRASTIC Approach to Controlling
Groundwater Pollution, 98 YALE L.J. 773, 784 (1989) (noting “the traditional deference
of the federal government to the states in the area of groundwater regulation”).
16
I do not address whether the Act’s existing approach to groundwater pollution—using
the promise of federal grant money to encourage the states to regulate that pollution
consistent with federal policies—is permissible. Cf. Jonathan Adler & Nathaniel Stewart,
Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional? Coercion, Cooperative Federalism and Conditional
Spending after NFIB v. Sebelius, 43 ECOLOGY L.Q. 671 (2016) (questioning the constitutionality of a similar conditional grant program in the Clean Air Act).
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waters” and “ground waters,” providing for direct federal regulation only
of the former.17 Contrary to the desire of some advocates and courts, the
consequences of that congressional choice cannot be avoided by the artifice
of classifying groundwater as a point source of pollution—groundwater
simply does not fit within the Act’s definition of point source.18
Neither may the congressional design be reworked through the socalled “conduit” theory, which several district courts recently have explicitly
adopted.19 This theory holds that groundwater, although not itself a point
source, nevertheless functions as a liability-maintaining “conduit” for point
source pollution that reaches regulated surface waters.20 The theory’s
advocates find support for it in the Clean Water Act’s goal to restore the
health of the nation’s waters,21 an aim that, admittedly, cannot be achieved
without taking groundwater into account.22
Although superficially attractive, the conduit theory falls apart on
closer scrutiny. Predicating direct federal regulation based on a rationale
of “what makes the best sense for water quality” cannot be reconciled with
the compromise—witnessed by the Clean Water Act’s treatment of nonpoint source pollution—between federal interests and states’ traditional
regulatory roles that the statute embodies.23 Undeniably, nonpoint source
17

See infra Section II.A.
See infra Section II.B.
19
See Tenn. Clean Water Network v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 2017 WL 3476069, at *42–*44
(M.D. Tenn. Aug. 4, 2017); Sierra Club v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 145 F. Supp. 3d 601, 606–08
(E.D. Va. 2015); Yadkin Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, 141 F. Supp. 3d
428, 445–46 (M.D. N.C. 2015); Hawaii Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui, 24 F. Supp. 3d 980,
996–98 (D. Haw. 2014). Arguably, the theory appears in embryo in N. Cal. River Watch v.
Mercer Fraser Co., 2005 WL 2122052, at *2–*3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2005), and perhaps
even earlier decisions. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Colo. Refining Co., 838 F. Supp. 1428, 1434
(D. Colo. 1993). But it is often difficult to ascertain in these early cases whether the courts
were merely using the existence of the groundwater connection to establish jurisdiction over
the original point source discharge itself. See N. Cal. River Watch, 2005 WL 2122052, at
*3 (“[T]his Court holds that a hydrological connection between a man-made settling basin
and a water of the United States is sufficient to subject the basin to the provisions of the
CWA.”) (emphasis added).
20
Given that “point source” is itself defined to include a “conduit,” see 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14),
there is a tension between the “conduit” theory and the concession that groundwater is not
itself a point source. Sensing this tension, at least one district court of the “conduit” camp has
concluded that groundwater can qualify as a point source. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, 24 F. Supp.
3d at 999.
21
See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
22
See Blumm & Thiel, supra note 4, at 367–69.
23
See Kenneth M. Murchison, Learning From More than Five-and-a-Half Decades of Federal Water Pollution Control Legislation: Twenty Lessons for the Future, 32 B.C. ENVTL.
18
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pollution poses a serious obstacle to achieving federal water quality
standards.24 And for decades the same has been true for a subset of that
pollution—groundwater pollution.25 Yet, despite its acknowledgment that
“nonpoint source pollution is . . . one of the last major barriers to achieving
state and national water quality goals[,] . . . Congress made a conscious
decision to leave regulation of nonpoint source pollution to the states” when
it passed the Clean Water Act.26 Hence, a water-quality-based argument
for groundwater regulation just boils down to a plain—and unconvincing—
disagreement with the congressional policy to allow the states to take on
a meaningful role in the national effort to end water pollution.27
The Article begins with an introduction to the Act’s direct and
indirect regulatory framework, explained through the lens of cooperative
federalism.28 The Article then proceeds to present and refute three theories for direct regulation of groundwater pollution: groundwater as
among the “navigable waters”29; groundwater as a “point source” of pollution added to regulated surface waters30; and groundwater as a “conduit”
of pollution added to regulated surface waters.31 The Article concludes
with a few thoughts about the difficulty of statutory interpretation in
environmental law.32

AFF. L. REV. 527, 584 (2005) (“The specific political compromise that produced the [Clean
Water Act] has continued to shape the federal framework . . . .”).
24
See William L. Andreen, No Virtue Like Necessity: Dealing With Nonpoint Source Pollution
and Environmental Flows in the Face of Climate Change, 34 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 255, 257 (2016)
(“The water quality problems that nonpoint source pollution can create can be severe, as
such discharges often contain nutrients and pesticides, bacteria, and organic materials,
as well as sediment and mine acid.”).
25
See Robert L. Glicksman & George Cameron Coggins, Groundwater Pollution I: The Problem and the Law, 35 KAN. L. REV. 75 (1986) (“[T]he nation’s groundwater supplies . . . are
in serious danger from a wide variety of sources.”).
26
Robin Kundis Craig & Anna M. Roberts, When Will Governments Regulate Nonpoint
Source Pollution? A Comparative Perspective, 42 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 2 (2015).
27
The importance of that role is as great today if not more so than when the law was enacted.
See Douglas R. Williams, Toward Regional Governance in Environmental Law, 46 AKRON
L. REV. 1047, 1052 (2013) (noting that states “play a dominant role in ensuring that water
quality is protected,” one that has become “central to the overall success of the CWA’s
regulatory program, representing a fairly dramatic shift from the underlying premises
of the program”).
28
See infra Part I.
29
See infra Section II.A.
30
See infra Section II.B.
31
See infra Section II.C.
32
See infra Part III.
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Without doubt, the question of whether discharges of pollution to
groundwater can ever be regulated under the Act is an important and
emerging issue concerning the Clean Water Act’s scope. As I hope to show
in this Article, because the subjection of such pollution to the Act’s direct
control would substantially increase the federal role in groundwater regulation, it would unavoidably upset the statute’s cooperative framework.
Moreover, and critically in my view, such expansion would undercut the
rights of property owners whose land-use activities may affect groundwater.33 Therefore, extending direct federal regulatory control to groundwater
pollution would constitute an unwarranted inflation of the Act’s already
bloated coverage.34
I.

THE CLEAN WATER ACT’S COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM
FRAMEWORK FOR WATER QUALITY REGULATION

What we commonly call today the Clean Water Act was a set of significant amendments enacted in response to the perceived shortcomings
of existing federal and state water quality law.35 Congress considered the
prior approach defective because it had “focused on the tolerable effects
rather than the preventable causes of water pollution.”36 That is to say, it
began with the establishment of water quality standards and worked backwards to the sources of pollution, but only if water quality standards
were not being met.37 Congress chose to overhaul this approach to include
33

See U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, at 1817 (“The [Clean Water] Act . . . continues to raise
troubling questions regarding the Government’s power to cast doubt on the full use and
enjoyment of private property throughout the Nation.”) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
34
See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 722 (plurality op.) (criticizing “the immense expansion of
federal regulation of land use that has occurred under the Clean Water Act—without any
change in the governing statute”).
35
For a summary of those shortcomings, see Jeffrey M. Lipman, Note, The Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972: Effective Controls at Last?, 39 BROOK. L. REV.
403, 403–04 (1972).
36
EPA v. Cal. ex rel. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 202 (1976). See Sen.
Edmund S. Muskie, A Legislator’s View of Impending Amendments to the Water Pollution
Control Act, B.C. INDUS. & COMM. L. REV. 629, 631 (1972) (“Instead of proceeding through
ambient water quality standards to control requirements, the bill provides directly for
control requirements [which] allows immediate application of enforceable control requirements . . . .”). See also David Drelich, Restoring the Cornerstone of the Clean Water Act,
34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 267, 304 (2009) (noting that “harm-based enforcement scheme” of
the Act’s predecessor statutes had “resulted in only one prosecution”).
37
See NDRC v. EPA, 915 F.2d 1314, 1316 (9th Cir. 1990). Thus, a discharger needed no
permit to deposit pollutants into a water that had “room to spare” in achieving its water
quality standards.
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a permitting regime for pollution discharges,38 while retaining in modified form the procedure for designating water quality standards.39
A.

The Act’s Structure for Direct Regulation

The central aspect of the new regime is the Act’s general prohibition on the unpermitted discharge of pollutants from point sources into
“navigable waters.”40 These aquatic features are defined—rather cryptically—to include the two “waters of the United States.”41 The permitting
regime is divided into programs: a discharge of dredged or fill material
requires a permit (commonly called a Section 404 permit) from the Army
Corps of Engineers,42 whereas a discharge of any other pollutant requires
a permit (commonly called a Section 402 or “NPDES” permit) from EPA.43
A distinctive aspect of the revamped Clean Water Act is the statute’s
authorization for permitting authority to be passed to the states.44 Although few states have obtained Section 404 permitting authority,45
nearly all have obtained Section 402 permitting authority.46
38

See Miss. Comm’n on Nat. Res. v. Costle, 625 F.2d 1269, 1272 (5th Cir. 1980) (“The
major change was the establishment of the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES), under which it is illegal to discharge pollutants without a permit complying with the Act.”).
39
See Lawrence S. Bazel, Comment, Water-Quality Standards, Maximum Loads, and the
Clean Water Act: The Need For Judicial Enforcement 34 HASTINGS L.J. 1245, 1253–54 (1983).
40
See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1362(12)(A). The prohibition also applies to point source pollution discharged to the water beyond the territorial seas and to the high seas, if from a
point source other than a vessel. See id. §§ 1362(9), (10), (12)(B).
41
Id. § 1362(7). The statute also deems the “territorial seas”—the water from the beach
to three miles offshore, see id. § 1362(8)—to be “navigable waters.” See id. § 1362(7).
42
See id. § 1344(a). A version of this permitting authority antedated the Clean Water Act,
deriving from the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, § 9, 30 Stat. 1121, 1151
(Mar. 3, 1899). See Lipman, supra note 35, at 413–16. Although that prior authority
applied generally to all pollution, the Act transferred most of it to EPA. See S. CONF. REP.
NO. 92-1236, at 138–39 (1972).
43
See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a).
44
See id. §§ 1342(b), 1344(g), (h).
45
EPA, State or Tribal Assumption of the Section 404 Permit Program, https://www.epa
.gov/cwa-404/state-or-tribal-assumption-section-404-permit-program [https://perma.cc
/9BYB-FNA2] (only Michigan and New Jersey). According to EPA, the reasons for the low
number of permit authority transfers include “lack of funding,” “concerns regarding Federal requirements and oversight,” and “the controversial nature of regulation of wetlands
and other aquatic resources.” Id.
46
See EPA, NPDES State Program Information, https://www.epa.gov/npdes/npdes-state
-program-information [https://perma.cc/44BT-6QJD].
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Violating the Act’s provisions for direct water quality regulation
can create significant civil and even criminal liability.47 Just the maximum daily civil penalty for unpermitted pollutant discharges is currently
pegged at $37,500.48 That is especially onerous when one considers that
liability will attach despite the discharger’s exercise of all due care.49 And
the threat of such liability is by no means insignificant, due to the Act’s
authorization for enforcement by private citizens,50 in addition to the EPA51
and the Corps.52
B.

Congressional Concern for State Prerogatives in a Cooperative
Federalism Framework

Despite this federally heavy-handed approach, the Act still adheres even within its direct regulatory provisions to a policy of allowing
the states to take an important role in water quality control.53 That

47

The Act “ ‘impose[s] criminal liability,’ as well as steep civil fines, ‘on a broad range of
ordinary industrial and commercial activities.’ ” Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 721 (plurality op.)
(quoting Hanousek v. United States, 528 U.S. 1102, 1103 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari)).
48
See 40 C.F.R. § 19.4, Table 1 (2011).
49
NRDC v. EPA, 822 F.2d 104, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“The Clean Water Act does not permit
pollution whenever that activity might be deemed reasonable or necessary; rather, the
statute provides that pollution is permitted only when discharged under the conditions
or limitations of a permit.”).
50
See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (authorizing citizen suits against any person for violation of any
effluent standard or limitation, or order pertaining to the same). Cf. Oliver A. Houck,
Standing on the Wrong Foot: A Case for Equal Protection, 58 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 15 n.91
(2007) [hereinafter Houck, Standing on the Wrong Foot] (“Two of the most citizen-enforced
programs in environmental law are the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts.”).
51
See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(1)–(3) (compliance orders); id. § 1319(d) (civil actions); id. § 1319(g)
(administrative penalties).
52
See id. § 1344(s)(1)–(4) (compliance orders, civil actions, and administrative penalties).
53
See S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 71 (“The Federal Government as the custodian of the navigable waters has the responsibility to control affirmatively any discharges of pollutants
into the navigable waters and, under the Committee bill, seek to achieve elimination of
the discharge of pollutants. [¶] It is expected that the States will play a major role in the
administration of this program.”); H.R. REP. NO. 92-911, at 125 (1971) (“Another problem
raised by the [current] permit program is the total usurpation of enforcement of water
quality control by the Federal Government. This is inconsistent with the Federal-State
partnership that is necessary if we are ever to have clean and safe waters. The role of the
States must be clearly recognized. It is impossible for the Federal Government to succeed
in this program without the close and active cooperation of the States. A system of
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policy is furthered most clearly through the Act’s permitting transfer
provisions.54 Although Congress has followed that approach in other
statutes,55 the practice is by no means universal or a default.56 Thus,
Congress’ decision to give the power to wield significant federal permitting authority with respect to controlling water pollution reflects its
particular concern “to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate
pollution,” as well as “to plan the development and use . . . of land and
water resources.”57
Such solicitude for the states’ prerogatives is not, however, limited
to the Act’s direct regulatory provisions. As noted above, the Clean Water
Act’s central prohibition makes unlawful “the discharge of any pollutant
by any person.”58 Because “discharge of a pollutant” is in turn expressly
defined as “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any
point source,”59 the Act by necessary implication leaves to the states to
regulate (or not to regulate) the addition of any pollutant to things other
than “navigable waters,” or the addition of any pollutant from a “nonpoint
source.”60 These inferred limitations on federal power—especially that
pertaining to nonpoint source pollution—also bear witness to the cooperative federalism framework embodied in the Act.61

permits which requires duplicative effort or destroys the initiative of the States and local
governments is wasteful and non-productive.”).
54
But it also can be seen in Section 401, 33 U.S.C. § 1341, which effectively gives the
states a veto power over projects requiring a Clean Water Act permit. See S. REP. NO. 92414, at 69 (“The purpose of the certification mechanism provided in this law is to assure
that Federal licensing or permitting agencies cannot override State water quality requirements.”).
55
See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 167–68 (discussing other examples).
56
For example, the Endangered Species Act reserves to the federal government the authority
to issue permits for the incidental take of listed species. See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(a).
57
33 U.S.C. § 1251(b).
58
Id. § 1311(a). See Allison LaPlante & Lia Comerford, On Judicial Review Under the Clean
Water Act in the Wake of Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center: What We
Now Know and What We Have Yet to Find Out, 43 ENVTL. L. 767, 773 (2013) (“The CWA’s
central prohibition lies in section 301 of the statute.”).
59
33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A) (emphases added).
60
See United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 260–61 (4th Cir. 1997).
61
See Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, 792 F.3d 281, 288 (3d Cir. 2015) (“Under th[e Clean
Water Act], the EPA and the states participate in a ‘cooperative federalism’ framework
working together to clean the Nation’s waters.”). See also 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (establishing
a national policy “to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights
of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution,” while also allowing the states “to

456

WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV.

[Vol. 42:447

What is cooperative federalism? Federalism itself is a basic principle
of our constitutional structure.62 According to that principle, the federal government is a government of enumerated powers63; all authority not expressly granted to it is reserved to the states or to the people.64 In a sense,
all federalism is cooperative: the federal government and the state governments, acting according to their unique prerogatives and competencies,
achieve a better regulatory result than would be the case if all power were
assigned to one level.65 The modifier “cooperative” thus must denote
something more: it refers to the value obtained when one level of government does have the constitutional authority to act, but nevertheless
recognizes that its policies would be better served by inviting other levels
of government to participate in regulation.66
Although cooperative federalism “retains some currency outside
of environmental law, it does not play as central a role in any other field.”67
And in the field of environmental law,68 one of the clearest examples of
cooperative federalism is the Clean Water Act.69 As one commentator noted
plan the development and use (including restoration, preservation and enhancement) of
land and water resources”).
62
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995).
63
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516 (1997).
64
U.S. CONST. amend. X. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999) (“The limited and
enumerated powers granted to the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Branches of the
National Government . . . underscore the vital role reserved to the States by the constitutional design . . . .”).
65
As, if not more, important than the governmental efficiencies that federalism encourages
is the protection and increase of liberty that it fosters. See New York v. United States, 505
U.S. at 181 (“ ‘[F]ederalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion
of sovereign power.’ ”) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting)). Professor Corwin memorably described federalism’s double nature as the
interplay between “more or less jealous rivals for power,” and “mutually supplementing
agencies of government.” Edward S. Corwin, National-State Cooperation—Its Present Possibilities, 46 YALE L.J. 599, 601 (1937).
66
Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law, 14 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 179, 184 (2005) (“Since the New Deal, cooperative federalism typically appears
as congressional or administrative efforts to induce . . . states to participate in a coordinated
federal program.”).
67
Id. at 187.
68
“Environmental law is an unplanned by-product of the unique politics of environmentalism
in the late 1960s and early 1970s” with “two distinct but overlapping branches, public
health protection and biodiversity conservation.” A. Dan Turlock, The Future of Environmental “Rule of Law” Litigation, 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 575, 581–82 (2002). In my view, the
Clean Water Act principally falls under Professor Turlock’s former branch, whereas, for
example, the Endangered Species Act falls under his latter branch.
69
See Jim Rossi & Thomas Hutton, Federal Preemption and Clean Energy Floors, 91 N.C.
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shortly after the law’s passage, “[t]he Act provides for an intricate system
of federal-state interaction in the administration and enforcement of the
Act, with emphasis on state responsibility.”70 Indeed, throughout the Act
one can find instances, in addition to the permitting-transfer authorities
discussed above, of congressional reliance on nonfederal methods to control
water pollution.71
For example, Section 208 expressly relies upon appropriate local or
regional governments to take charge of cleaning up areas with greaterthan-usual water quality control problems.72 Section 303(a) provides for the
states, not the federal government, to establish water quality standards for
a state’s waters.73 Similarly, Section 303(d) places principal responsibility
on the states again for identifying those waters within their jurisdictions
that do not meet water quality standards, and which should therefore be
deemed “impaired.”74 And Section 303(e) directs states to create and
maintain continuing planning processes for addressing water pollution.75
L. REV. 1283, 1294–95 (2013) (observing that the Act’s allowance for state-created water
quality standards is “widely considered a leading example of cooperative federalism”).
70
Charles W. Smith, Highlights of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, 77 DICK.
L. REV. 459, 460 (1973). See Colburn T. Cherney & Karen M. Wardzinski, State and Federal
Roles Under the Clean Water Act, 1 NAT. RES. & ENV’T 19, 22 (1986) (“Congress has entrusted to EPA and the states the joint responsibility of implementing the NPDES permit
program under the Clean Water Act. Only through a cooperative . . . relationship between
EPA and the state can this obligation be carried out effectively.”).
71
See Fischman, supra note 66, at 190–91 (explaining how the Act uses federal funding
to support state-based programs, and allows states to develop water quality standards
that are stricter and more locally tailored than federal standards).
72
See 33 U.S.C. § 1288. One early commentator reckoned Section 208 to be a key component to the Act’s ability to control nonpoint source pollution, provided continued Congressional interest in local land-use decision-making. See Michael Jungman, Comment, Areawide
Planning under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972: Intergovernmental and Land Use Implications, 54 TEX. L. REV. 1047, 1080 (1976) (“Section 208 will
foster effective programs to improve water quality through land use management, but Congress must pass additional legislation to ensure adequate progress in achieving other
equally important objectives that require land use planning.”).
73
33 U.S.C. § 1313(a). See Miss. Comm’n on Nat. Res., 625 F.2d at 1275 (“Congress did
place primary authority for establishing water quality standards with the states.”). The
Clean Water Act’s water quality standards program is in fact a continuation of the longstanding federal policy to defer to the states in establishing pollution control goals. See
Jeffrey M. Gaba, Federal Supervision of State Water Quality Standards Under the Clean
Water Act, 36 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1177–80 (1983).
74
33 U.S.C. § 1313(d).
75
Id. § 1313(e). One might also cite Section 401, which gives states a near veto-power
over projects involving pollution discharge that require a federal permit. See id. § 1341.
I do not cite the section in the text because its importance today is a direct result of the
wondrously expansive reading that EPA and the Corps have, to some extent, successfully
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These are activities that conceivably could be done in the first instance
at the federal level, but Congress elected otherwise.
Notably, these state-based authorities and responsibilities figure
prominently in the states’ administration of the Clean Water Act’s permitting programs.76 If, then, Congress was willing to allow states to retain
such a significant regulatory role in areas—such as point source pollution—where a distinctive federal overhaul was expressly effected,77 it
should not be surprising that, as we shall see, Congress chose to defer
even more broadly to the states in regulating nonpoint source pollution,78
for which Congressional concern was not at that time paramount.79
C.

Cooperative Federalism and Nonpoint Source Pollution

The Act does not define “nonpoint source pollution,”80 but by logical
implication it is “pollution that does not result from the ‘discharge’ or ‘addition’ of pollutants from a point source.”81 Such pollution typically is
caused by “rainfall around activities that employ or cause pollutants,”82 and
which thereupon enters regulated waters “primarily through indiscrete

attributed to “navigable waters.” Cf. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 722 (plurality op.) (“[An]
immense expansion of federal regulation of land use that has occurred under the Clean
Water Act—without any change in the governing statute—during the past five Presidential
administrations [that has resulted in] [a]ny plot of land containing such a channel [of
ephemeral water] may potentially be regulated as a ‘water of the United States.’ ”).
Congress, in my view, did not intend the Act to operate like a land-use regulation, Gary
E. Parish & J. Michael Morgan, History, Practice and Emerging Problems of Wetlands
Regulation: Reconsidering Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 17 LAND & WATER L. REV.
43, 84 (1982) (“There should be little doubt that Congress did not intend such a result.”),
and so I do not believe that Congress intended Section 401 to play the outsized role in
water-pollution regulation that it does today.
76
For example, permits must be consistent with the water quality standards and related
limitations that states adopt pursuant to Section 303 of the Act. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b);
40 C.F.R. § 122.44(d)(1).
77
See Or. Nat. Desert Ass’n, 172 F.3d at 1096 (observing that the Act “overhauled the
regulation of water quality” through “[d]irect federal regulation [of] the level of effluent
that flows from point sources” by means of “the issuance of permits”).
78
See Appalachian Power Co., 545 F.2d at 1373 (“Congress consciously distinguished
between point source and nonpoint source discharges, giving EPA authority under the
Act to regulate only the former.”).
79
Even Professor Houck, who believes that the importance of the states to the Act’s structure
is overplayed, nevertheless acknowledges that the Act only “relegates the states to a
highly circumscribed role for those dischargers most on the national mind in 1972”—
namely, “point sources.” Houck, Cooperative Federalism, supra note 9, at 10428.
80
The Act does, however, use the term. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1288(b)(2)(F)(i), (j)(1); id. § 1329(k).
81
Swanson v. U.S. Forest Serv., 87 F.3d 339, 342 n.2 (9th Cir. 1996).
82
United States v. Earth Sci., Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 373 (10th Cir. 1979).
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and less identifiable natural processes such as runoffs, precipitation and
percolation.”83 In part because “the control of nonpoint source pollution
[i]s so dependent on such site-specific factors as topography, soil structure,
rainfall, vegetation, and land use,” Congress “shift[ed] primary control
for the control of nonpoint source pollution to the states.”84
The relevant legislative history, although by no means decisive,85
nevertheless supports the conclusion that Congress recognized the practical, and federalism-based, reasons for allowing nonfederal actors to take
the lead in addressing nonpoint source pollution.86 From the Senate floor,
Senator Edwin Muskie—the Act’s chief sponsor in the upper House87—
emphasized that, although “a great quantity of pollutants is discharged by
[nonpoint source] runoff,”88 the Act’s discharge standards pertain only to
point source pollution.89 The reason, he explained, was that “[t]here is no
effective way, as yet other than land use control, by which you can
intercept that [nonpoint source] runoff and control it in the way that you
do a point source.90 In other words, because nonpoint source pollution is
principally a problem of land-use, its resolution falls principally within
the states’ regulatory domain.
***
The preceding discussion establishes that an interpretation of the
Act that would result in a substantial amount of such nonpoint source
83

Cordiano v. Metacon Gun Club, Inc., 575 F.3d 199, 220 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting FRANK
P. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVTL LAW § 3.03 (updated 2009)).
84
Shanty Town Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. EPA, 843 F.2d 782, 791 (4th Cir. 1988).
85
See Jeffrey G. Miller, Plain Meaning, Precedent, and Metaphysics: Interpreting the “Point
Source” Element of the Clean Water Act Offense, 45 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11129,
11131 (2015) (besides discussion over the regulation of thermal discharges, “[n]othing in
the House, Senate, or Conference Reports further explains the meanings of point source,
nonpoint source, the differences between the two terms, or why the permit programs are
limited to point sources”).
86
Shanty Towns Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 843 F.2d at 791.
87
Although the “remarks of a single legislator, even the sponsor, are not controlling in analyzing legislative history,” Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 311 (1979) (emphasis
added), the floor statement of a sponsor is among “the most authoritative and reliable
materials of legislative history,” Disabled in Action of Met. N.Y. v. Hammons, 202 F.3d
110, 124 (2d Cir. 2000).
88
H. COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, 93D CONG., LEGIS. HISTORY OF THE WATERS POLLUTION
CONTROL ACT AMENDS. OF 1972 at 1315 (Comm. Print 1973) [hereinafter LEGIS. HISTORY
OF WATERS POLLUTION CONTROL ACT]; Miller, supra note 85, at 11131.
89
LEGIS. HISTORY OF WATERS POLLUTION CONTROL ACT, supra note 88, at 1314.
90
Id. at 1315.
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pollution being shifted to direct federal control—as opposed to leaving it
subject to the indirect methods that the Act currently espouses91—would
conflict with the cooperative framework that Congress has chosen to address pollution from nonpoint sources. As I explain below, regulation of
pollution discharges to groundwater would upset this federal-state balance. Because Congress has not expressly authorized that rebalancing, the
Act therefore should not be interpreted to encompass direct federal
control of such pollution.92
II.

DISCHARGES TO GROUNDWATER ARE NOT SUBJECT TO DIRECT
FEDERAL CONTROL UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT

Three theories have been developed to justify direct federal regulation of groundwater pollution under the Clean Water Act: (i) groundwater
is among the “navigable waters”; (ii) groundwater is a “point source” for pollution that reaches regulated surface waters; and (iii) groundwater, although not a “point source,” nevertheless operates as a liability-sustaining
“conduit” for point source pollution that reaches regulated surface waters.93
As set forth below, none of these theories of liability withstands scrutiny.94
They all suffer from the same defect: attempting to undo the statute’s
cooperative federalism framework, either by increasing the number of
waters subject to direct federal regulation, or by improperly converting
nonpoint source pollution into directly regulated point source pollution.95
A.

Groundwater Is Not Among the “Navigable Waters”

As previously noted, the Act does not directly regulate all waters
within the United States, but rather only “navigable waters.”96 The statute
91

Pronsolino, 291 F.3d at 1126–27.
See Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2089 (2014) (“[I]f the Federal Government
would ‘radically readjust[ ] the balance of state and national authority, those charged
with the duty of legislating [must be] reasonably explicit’ about it.”) (quoting BFP v.
Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 544 (1994)).
93
Allison L. Kvien, Note, Is Groundwater That Is Hydrologically Connected to Navigable
Waters Covered Under the CWA?: Three Theories of Coverage and Alternative Remedies for
Groundwater Pollution, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 957, 984–91 (2015).
94
For a compendium of cases addressing the extent to which the Act reaches groundwater
pollution, see id. at 1001–10. Rather than discuss particular cases, I principally address
in this part the main arguments that have been developed by certain courts and commentators to justify direct federal regulation of groundwater pollution under the Act.
95
Id. at 979, 981.
96
See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (prohibiting “the discharge of any pollutant”); id. § 1362(12)(A)
92
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also repeatedly distinguishes between “navigable waters” and “ground
waters.”97 For example, Section 102 of the Act requires the preparation
of comprehensive programs for water pollution control for “the navigable
waters and ground waters.”98 Section 104 mandates the establishment
of a water surveillance system for monitoring the quality of, among other
things, “the navigable waters and ground waters.”99 Section 106 conditions federal funding of state pollution control programs on, among other
things, the establishment of monitoring and data collection for “the quality
of navigable waters and to the extent practicable, ground waters.”100 And
Section 304 requires both the production of federal guidelines for maintaining water quality for, among other things, “all navigable waters [and]
ground waters,”101 as well as federal pollution control guidelines that
take account of “changes in the movement, flow, or circulation of any
navigable waters or ground waters.”102
If Congress had intended groundwater to be considered part of
“navigable waters,” it would have had no reason to list it separately in
the foregoing sections.103 Indeed, although the Act mentions “ground
waters” repeatedly, the term is absent from that Title of the Act governing water quality standards and permitting.104 Thus, reading “ground
waters” to be included in “navigable waters” would violate two well-established canons of statutory interpretation: the inclusion of text in one
portion of a statute and its exclusion elsewhere means that the text should
(defining “discharge of a pollutant” to include “any addition of any pollutant to navigable
waters”). See also id. § 1362(12)(B) (regulating discharges from point sources other than
vessels on the waters of the contiguous zone and the high seas).
97
The distinction was one that the EPA Administrator himself made during the hearings
leading to the Act’s adoption. See Hearings before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution
of the Comm. on Public Works, on Bills Amending the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
and Other Pending Legislation Relating to Water Pollution Control, 92d Cong. 5 (1971)
(statement of William Ruckleshaus, EPA Administrator) (“We would extend water quality
standards to all navigable waters and their tributaries, whether interstate or intrastate,
as well as to ground waters . . . .”).
98
33 U.S.C. § 1252(a).
99
Id. § 1254(a)(5).
100
Id. § 1256(e)(1).
101
Id. § 1314(a)(2).
102
Id. § 1314(f)(2)(F).
103
See Tri-Realty Co. v. Ursinus College, No. 11-5885, 2013 WL 6164092, at *9 n.7 (E.D.
Pa. Nov. 21, 2013) (noting that, in the part of the Act dealing “with program development
and the study of water pollution, Congress consistently refers to ‘navigable waters and
ground waters,’ ” but in the part of the Act concerning “water quality and discharge
permit[ ] Congress uses only the phrase ‘navigable waters’ ”).
104
Id.
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not be implied where it is not expressly found105; and text should not be
interpreted to be superfluous.106 The textual argument against reading
“navigable waters” to include “ground waters” is rather robust.107
The argument is strengthened by the Clean Water Act’s legislative history. The report of the Senate Committee on Public Works, while
noting the harms posed by groundwater pollution,108 nevertheless “evidences a clear intent to leave the establishment of standards and controls for groundwater pollution to the states.”109 For example, the report
explains that, “[b]ecause the jurisdiction regarding groundwaters is so
complex and varied from State to State, the Committee did not adopt
th[e] recommendation” to establish federal pollution standards for groundwater.110 A similar effort was rejected in the House of Representatives.111
In that body, Representative Aspin of Wisconsin had proposed an amendment on the floor that would have prohibited the unpermitted “addition
of any pollutant to any ground waters from any point source.”112 Rising
against the amendment, Representative Clausen—a House bill sponsor113—
explained that “there was not sufficient information on ground waters to
justify the types of controls that are required for navigable waters.”114 He
noted that a provision of the existing bill—ultimately carried forward into
the enacted law115—specifically addressed groundwater pollution by denying the transfer of permitting authority if a state could not demonstrate
that it had the power to control the disposal of pollutants into wells.116
The Aspin amendment was resoundingly voted down.117 Advocates of

105

See O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 86–87 (1994).
Marx v. Gen. Rev. Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 386 (2013).
107
See Cape Fear River Watch, Inc. v. Duke Energy Progress, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 3d 798,
810 (E.D. N.C. 2014) (“Congress did not intend for the CWA to extend federal regulatory
authority over groundwater, regardless of whether that groundwater is eventually or
somehow ‘hydrologically connected’ to navigable surface waters.”).
108
S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 3739 (“The importance of groundwater in the hydrological cycle
cannot be underestimated . . . . Groundwater pollution is not as serious a national
problem at present as is surface water pollution, but groundwater availability and quality
is deteriorating.”).
109
Exxon Corp. v. Train, 554 F.2d 1310, 1325 (5th Cir. 1977).
110
S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 3739.
111
LEGIS. HISTORY OF WATERS POLLUTION CONTROL ACT, supra note 88, at 597.
112
See id. at 589.
113
Umatilla Waterquality Protective Ass’n, Inc. v. Smith Frozen Foods, Inc., 962 F. Supp.
1312, 1319 (D. Or. 1997). See supra note 87 (on the weight to be given to a sponsor’s views).
114
LEGIS. HISTORY OF WATERS POLLUTION CONTROL ACT, supra note 88, at 591.
115
See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1)(D).
116
LEGIS. HISTORY OF WATERS POLLUTION CONTROL ACT, supra note 88, at 591.
117
See id. at 597.
106
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groundwater regulation have tried to minimize the significance of the
Aspin amendment’s rejection, arguing that it means only that Congress
did not believe that all groundwater—isolated as well as connected—
should be regulated.118 But this explanation fails to recognize that none
of those who spoke against the amendment did so because the amendment
was overbroad.119 Moreover, there is no indication that Mr. Aspin himself
thought that the amendment would extend to isolated groundwater.120
No doubt taking their cue in part from the statute’s text and
legislative history, the EPA and the Corps also have concluded that
groundwater is not itself “navigable waters.”121 In their 2015 rule-making
to define “waters of the United States,” EPA and the Corps expressly excluded “groundwater.”122 The agencies did so despite their Science Advisory Board’s admonition that the “exclusion[ ] of groundwater . . . do[es]
not have scientific justification.”123 As EPA and the Corps explained, the
rule excluded groundwater because “the agencies have never interpreted
[it] to be a ‘water of the United States.’ ”124 Indeed, even courts that have
approved direct federal regulation of groundwater-derived pollution have
recognized that groundwater itself is not a regulated water.125

118

See Kvien, supra note 93, at 965. Another commentator has contended that the Aspin
amendment may have been rejected simply because it would have eliminated the definitional exclusion for “pollutant” applicable to oil and gas wells. See Mary Christina Wood,
Regulating Discharges Into Groundwater: The Crucial Link in Pollution Control Under the
Clean Water Act, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 569, 613–14 (1988). But as many who spoke
against the amendment did so because of its groundwater effects as those who did so because of its elimination of the definitional exclusion. See LEGIS. HISTORY OF WATERS
POLLUTION CONTROL ACT, supra note 88, at 590–97.
119
LEGIS. HISTORY OF WATERS POLLUTION CONTROL ACT, supra note 88, at 590–97.
120
See id. at 589 (“If we do not stop pollution of ground waters through seepage and other
means, ground water gets into navigable waters, and to control only the navigable water
and not the ground water makes no sense at all.”).
121
See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37,073
(June 29, 2015) (EPA and Army Corps rule-making noting that “groundwater . . . ha[s]
never [been] interpreted to be a ‘water of the United States’ ”). See also Vill. of Oconomowoc
Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 24 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 1994) (“Neither the Clean Water
Act nor the EPA’s definition asserts authority over ground waters, just because these
may be hydrologically connected with surface waters.”).
122
See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. at
37,105 (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b)(5)); id. at 37,114 (to be codified at 33 C.F.R.
§ 122.2(2)(v)).
123
Id. at 37,064–65.
124
Id. at 37,073.
125
See, e.g., Tenn. Clean Water Network, 2017 WL 3476069, at *43 (“The Court agrees with
those courts that ‘view[ ] the issue not as whether the CWA regulates the discharge of
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Against this significant collection of evidence, advocates for direct
federal regulation point to the Act’s definition of “pollutant.”126 That
definition specifically excludes material injected into a well in connection
with oil or gas production, so long as the well has been state-approved
and the injection will not degrade “ground or surface water resources.”127
The argument goes that Congress would have had no reason to exclude
such underground pollution from the Act’s definition of “pollutant” unless
it had believed that such pollution otherwise would be subject to the
Act.128 Of course, the natural rejoinder is that the Act’s definition section
applies throughout the statute—to its regulatory as well as to its research
and funding sections.129 Hence, Congress could quite reasonably have decided that the definitional exclusion was necessary to avoid triggering
the nonregulatory provisions of the Act, even while maintaining that the
exclusion was unnecessary to avoid triggering the Act’s direct regulatory
exclusions.130 And it is no answer to the foregoing that Congress could
simply have specified that the exclusion only apply to the Act’s nonregulatory provisions.131 Such a selected exclusion might well have given rise
to the unjustified implied conclusion that such pollutant injections would
otherwise be regulated under the Act.
In short, the omission of groundwater from direct federal regulatory control under the Clean Water Act “is not an oversight,” but rather
reflects “Congress[‘] elect[ion] to leave the subject to state law.”132 Recognizing that groundwater is not among the statute’s “navigable waters”
thus directly vindicates the Act’s cooperative federalism framework.133

pollutants into groundwater itself but rather whether the CWA regulates the discharge
of pollutants to navigable waters via groundwater.’ ”) (quoting Yadkin Riverkeeper, Inc.,
141 F. Supp. 3d at 445)); Hawaii Wildlife Fund, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 996 (upholding liability
on a “conduit theory,” but still recognizing that an “unpermitted discharge into the groundwater, without more, does not constitute a violation of the Clean Water Act”).
126
See Wood, supra note 118, at 607–09.
127
33 U.S.C. § 1362(6)(B).
128
Wood, supra note 118, at 609.
129
See 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (directing that the section’s definitions apply “when used in this
chapter” unless “otherwise specifically provided”).
130
See Exxon Corp., 554 F.2d at 1321 n.19. See also United States v. GAF Corp., 389 F. Supp.
1379, 1384 (S.D. Tex. 1975) (“It is at least plausible that Congress intended to include within
the scope of research under Subchapter I of the Act and of the permit programs, especially
those of the States, under Subchapter IV that which was excluded from the enforcement
provisions of Subchapter III.”) (footnote and citations omitted).
131
Wood, supra note 118, at 608.
132
Vill. of Oconomowoc Lake, 24 F.3d at 965.
133
See Jason R. Jones, Comment, The Clean Water Act: Groundwater Regulation and the
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Groundwater Is Not a “Point Source”

The Clean Water Act defines “point source” as “any discernible,
confined and discrete conveyance,” and then lists a number of illustrative
items, including pipes, ditches, channels, and conduits.134 Several decisions have recognized that groundwater does not fit within this statutory
definition.135 In fact, as one commentator otherwise friendly to groundwater regulation has conceded, “[c]ontrasting even the most ‘confined and
discrete’ groundwater with traditional point sources such as pipes makes
the contention that groundwater can be a point source look like a rather
weak one.”136
The fit between groundwater and the statutory definition of “point
source” is poor because, unlike pollutants contained in a point source,
polluted groundwater typically does not flow in discrete channels but
instead oozes through the hollow spaces of subterranean material.137 As
Representative Roncolio observed in speaking against the failed Aspin
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, 8 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 93, 111
(1999) (“[A]lthough Congress found the quality of the nation’s groundwater important,
Congress . . . intended to distinguish between groundwater and surface water [so as] to
encourage the states to develop and to implement groundwater pollution control programs,
but to preclude federal enforcement.”).
134
33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
135
See Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P., No. 8:16-4003-HMH,
2017 WL 2266875, at *5 (D.S.C. Apr. 20, 2017) (“[M]igration of pollutants through soil and
groundwater is nonpoint source pollution.”); Tri-Realty Co., 2013 WL 6164092 at *7 n.7 (“A
discharge of pollutants into navigable waters occurring only through migration of groundwater and uncontrolled soil runoff represents ‘nonpoint source’ pollution.”); Chesapeake
Bay Found., Inc. v. Severstal Sparrows Point, LLC, 794 F. Supp. 2d 602, 619–20 (D. Md.
2011) (“Discharge from migrations of groundwater or soil runoff is not point source pollution, however, but nonpoint source pollution.”); Ky. Waterways Alliance v. Ky. Utils. Co.,
2017 WL 6628917, at *10 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 28, 2017) (“Groundwater is, by its nature, ‘a diffuse
medium’ and not the kind of discernible, confined and discrete conveyance contemplated by
the [Clean Water Act’s] definition of ‘point source.’ ”) (quoting 26 Crown Assocs., LLC v.
Greater New Haven Reg. Water Pollution Control Auth., 2017 WL 2960506, at *8 (D.
Conn. July 11, 2017)).
136
Kvien, supra note 93, at 986.
137
See James W. Hayman, Regulating Point-Source Discharges to Groundwater Hydrologically Connected to Navigable Waters: An Unresolved Question of Environmental Protection
Agency Authority Under the Clean Water Act, 5 BARRY L. REV. 95, 121 (2005) (“[G]roundwater
is that water which exists in the pore spaces among the soil or rock material below the water
table . . . . In order for groundwater to move through soil or rock material, the pore spaces
(i.e., porosity) must be interconnected to create flow paths (i.e., permeability).”) (footnote
omitted); 26 Crown Assocs., 2017 WL 2960506, at *8 (“It is basic science that ground water
is widely diffused by saturation within the crevices of underground rocks and soil.”).
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amendment, “water that is seeped into the ground and returns to the
aq[uifer] or streamflow is not a point of discharge.”138 In other words, the
mere fact that pollutants can flow through X does not make X a point
source conveyance.139
At least one district court has thought otherwise. In Hawaii
Wildlife Fund, the court ruled that groundwater can qualify as a “discrete and confined” conveyance if it can transport “a high proportion of
a pollutant from one place to another . . . , irrespective of its other geologic properties.”140 Rejecting the argument that pollution could become
so diffuse in groundwater that it would not trigger liability, the court
explained that “a diffused conduit is no less covered under the Act if it
actually conveys pollutants to navigable-in-fact water.”141 The court’s
argument is not convincing. First, given that Clean Water Act liability
generally does not depend on the amount of pollutant discharged,142 it
would be odd to make the pollutant-conveyance potential of X determine
whether X is a liability-creating point source. Second, one can certainly
conceive of “a high proportion of a pollutant” being conveyed to regulated
waters by virtue of unconfined, rainfall-induced, sheet flow—the classic
example of nonpoint source pollution143—which all would acknowledge
the Act does not regulate. Third, as noted in the preceding paragraph,
that X can convey pollutants to regulated waters does not mean that X
is a point source.144 Were that not so, then the concept of nonpoint source
pollution would be meaningless; for by the very fact of having reached
regulated waters by some outside agency—i.e., having been conveyed to
those waters—the discharge would necessarily consist only of point
source pollution.145 In a word, Hawaii Wildlife Fund renders nonpoint
source pollution a contradiction in terms.

138

LEGIS. HISTORY OF WATERS POLLUTION CONTROL ACT, supra note 88, at 590.
See Miller, supra note 85, at 11132.
140
Hawaii Wildlife Fund, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 999.
141
Id. at 1000.
142
See Minnehaha Creek Watershed Dist. v. Hoffman, 597 F.2d 617, 626–27 (8th Cir. 1979)
(“We find no justification in the Act for the District Court’s conclusion that a significant
alteration in water quality must be demonstrated before the addition of a particular
substance to navigable waters can be classified as the discharge of a pollutant.”).
143
See EPA, What is Nonpoint Source?, https://www.epa.gov/nps/what-nonpoint-source
[https://perma.cc/M3DV-MJX7] (“Nonpoint source pollution generally results from land
runoff, precipitation, atmospheric deposition, drainage, seepage or hydrologic modification.”).
144
Miller, supra note 85, at 11132.
145
The argument assumes, not unreasonably in my view, that a pollutant cannot travel
from point A to point B unless it is in some sense conveyed (even if only by “nature”) from
point A to point B.
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Besides illogicality, defining groundwater as a point source would
introduce a significant and unprecedented layer of federal regulation,
even for those landowners who do not discharge pollutants but who
happen to own land over a polluted aquifer.146 The “owner” of groundwater in most states is anyone who owns a portion of the land above the
aquifer.147 Such a landowner could easily be considered an “owner” of the
groundwater “point source” beneath his or her property, and thus be
liable for the polluted groundwater that is conveyed to regulated surface
waters.148 For that reason, the landowner would become subject as well
to the Act’s burdensome monitoring and record-keeping requirements for
point source owners.149 These serious consequences for the nation’s
owners of groundwater rights marks another reason why an implied
direct regulatory control over groundwater pollution makes for bad statutory interpretation.150
C.

The “Conduit” Theory Improperly Expands the Act’s Coverage

Recently, several district courts have adopted the theory that, even
if groundwater itself is neither a regulated water nor a point source, liability may attach to a point source discharge of pollutants to groundwater,
if those pollutants reach a regulated surface water.151 As a leading decision
explains the theory, a “discharge into groundwater . . . is functionally
equivalent to a discharge into the [regulated surface water] itself . . . . as
long as the groundwater is a conduit through which pollutants are
reaching [regulated surface] water.”152 Typically, this theory of liability

146

“An aquifer is any underground formation saturated with water.” James T.B. Tripp
& Adam B. Jaffe, Preventing Groundwater Pollution: Towards a Coordinated Strategy to
Protect Critical Recharge Zones, 3 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 3 n.19 (1979).
147
See Joseph W. Dellapenna, A Primer on Groundwater Law, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 265,
271–72 (2013).
148
See United States v. Huseby, 862 F. Supp. 2d 951, 965 (D. Minn. 2012) (liability extends
to those with responsibility for or control over the pollution discharge).
149
See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1318(a)(4)(A), 1318(a)(4)(B), 1318(b). The burden of such obligations
for groundwater owners would be especially severe. See Tripp & Jaffe, supra note 146,
at 4 (“[M]onitoring groundwater quality is fundamentally more difficult than monitoring
surface water quality . . . .”).
150
Cf. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 653 (1978) (running through “[t]he history
of the relationship between the Federal Government and the States in the reclamation of
the arid lands of the Western States” is a “consistent thread of purposeful and continued
deference to state water law by Congress”).
151
See Tenn. Clean Water Act Network, 2017 WL 3476069, at *43–44; Hawaii Wildlife Fund,
24 F. Supp. 3d at 997–98. See also Kvien, supra note 93, at 987–88.
152
Hawaii Wildlife Fund, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 994.
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is limited by the requirements that (i) the connection through groundwater between surface point source and regulated surface water be “direct”
or “immediate,”153 and (ii) the surface-water pollution be traceable
through the groundwater connection back to the original point source.154
Even with these limitations, the “conduit” theory is an impermissible extension of federal regulation.
To begin with, the conduit theory cannot be reconciled with the
Act’s text.155 The statute prohibits the unpermitted discharge of any
pollutant,156 which activity in turn is defined as “any addition of any
pollutant to navigable waters from any point source.”157 Liability therefore requires that the addition of a pollutant to regulated waters occur
by virtue of a point source conveyance.158 Groundwater, however, is not
a point source.159 Thus, groundwater’s conveyance of pollutants to regulated waters cannot trigger liability because it consists solely of the
delivery of nonpoint source pollution.160
Nothing in the Supreme Court’s Clean Water Act case law is to
the contrary.161 It is true that, in Rapanos v. United States, a plurality of
the High Court suggested that liability may attach to discharges that
“naturally” but not “directly” reach regulated waters.162 This observation
was part of the plurality opinion’s attempt to show that its narrow interpretation of “navigable waters” would not necessarily lead to a significant reduction in the Act’s scope.163 As the plurality explained, prior
lower court decisions had affirmed liability for pollutant discharges “even
153

E.g., Amicus Br. of United States at 12, Hawaii Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui, No.
15-17447 (9th Cir. May 31, 2016) [hereinafter EPA Amicus Br.]; Tenn. Clean Water Act
Network, 2017 WL 3476069, at *44.
154
E.g., Hawaii Wildlife Fund, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 1000.
155
Ky. Waterways Alliance, 2017 WL 6628917, at *11.
156
33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
157
§ 1362(12)(A).
158
See S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 105 (2004)
(“[A] point source need not be the original source of the pollutant; it need only convey the
pollutant to ‘navigable waters’ . . . .”).
159
Id.
160
See Tripp & Jaffe, supra note 146, at 13 (“A possible explanation for the exclusion of
groundwater from the major regulatory provisions of the Act might be that Congress
considered groundwater pollution to be, in effect, nonpoint source pollution . . . .”).
161
See Hawaii Wildlife Fund, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 996 (“While it makes sense to regulate
groundwater under the conduit theory, this court acknowledges that it cannot point to
controlling appellate law or statutory text expressly allowing this theory in the present
context.”).
162
Rapanos, 57 U.S. at 743.
163
See id. at 742–43.
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if the pollutants discharged from a point source do not emit ‘directly into’
covered waters, but pass ‘through conveyances’ in between.”164 In other
words, the plurality was entertaining a point-source-to-point-source-toregulated-water theory of liability. That is why the plurality thought it
relevant that those features that might no longer qualify as “waters of
the United States” under its test could still be deemed to be point sources.165
This reading of Rapanos is not hair-splitting. There is, after all, a significant difference between a theory of liability based on (i) point-source-topoint-source-to-regulated-water, and (ii) point source pollution traveling
through a nonpoint source like groundwater—potentially for many miles—
before reaching regulated surface waters. Seeking approval from the
Rapanos plurality for the liability-expanding conduit theory is particularly
inapt, given that the plurality’s clear intent was to narrow, not expand,
the Act’s scope.166
Defenders of the conduit theory also assert that the theory comports with the Clean Water Act’s purposes, in light of the interrelation
between groundwater pollution and surface water pollution.167 As one early
district court decision puts the point, “since the goal of the [Act] is to protect
the quality of surface waters, any pollutant which enters such waters,
whether directly or through groundwater, is subject to regulation.”168 The
argument fails, however, in two important ways. First, it ignores that, as
a general matter of statutory interpretation, “it is one thing for Congress
164

Id.
See id. at 743. The opinion’s recitation of the lower court case law supporting that
possibility reveals that in nearly all of the cited cases, the “indirect” discharge was simply
the result of a series of point-source-to-point-source conveyances.
166
See, e.g., id. at 768 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[T]he plurality proceeds to impose two limitations on the Act; but these limitations, it is here submitted, are without support . . . .”);
id. at 800 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The plurality imposes two novel conditions on the
exercise of the Corps’ jurisdiction that can only muddy the jurisdictional waters.”).
167
See Kvien, supra note 93, at 980–81; Brett Smith, Note, Pollution Problems in Paradise:
Does the Clean Water Act Apply to Groundwater Pollution in Maui?, 22 J. ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY 292, 309 (2016). But at least one strong defender of the regulation of
groundwater pollution through the Clean Water Act acknowledges that “incorporating
groundwater into [the Act’s framework] can only be achieved by construing either ‘point
source’ or ‘navigable waters’ to include groundwater.” Wood, supra note 118, at 574.
168
Wash. Wilderness Coal. v. Hecla Mining Co., 870 F. Supp. 983, 990 (E.D. Wash. 1994).
See Anna Makowski, Beneath the Surface of the Clean Water Act: Exploring the Depth of
the Act’s Jurisdictional Scope of Groundwater Pollution, 91 OR. L. REV. 495, 516 (2012)
(“From a policy standpoint, it makes sense to allow regulation of pollution to hydrologically connected groundwater because Congress did not intend to create ‘a ground water
loophole through which the discharges of pollutants could flow, unregulated, to surface
water.’ ”) (quoting 66 Fed. Reg. 2960, 3016 (Jan. 12, 2001)).
165
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to announce a grand goal, and quite another for it to mandate full implementation of that goal.”169 In other words, a statute does not always pursue
its stated objectives “at all costs.”170 Second, the argument does not recognize that “clean water is not [the Clean Water Act’s] only purpose”—also
relevant “is the preservation of primary state responsibility for ordinary
land-use decisions.”171 Indeed, one critical reason why Congress chose not
to regulate all waters in the country, or all sources of pollution, was precisely because it would require an unprecedented and unwanted federal
intrusion into land-use regulation,172 a traditional area of state regulatory pre-eminence.173 By privileging one statutory purpose over another,
the conduit theory impermissibly overrides the delicate legislative balance
between federal and state control that the Clean Water Act codifies.174
Because the purpose-based argument is perhaps what the defenders of the conduit theory consider to be its strongest point, and because
such an approach to statutory interpretation I believe to be especially
pernicious, allow me to dwell a bit on the issue. In doing so, I hope that
the defects in such a purpose-based approach will be seen more readily.
To that end, I set forth below the conduit theory’s purpose-based defense
in two steps, drawing from an oft-cited 2005 district court decision that
presaged the more recent conduit-favorable case law.175
Question: Does the Clean Water Act directly regulate groundwater
pollution?
Step 1: Acknowledge the Clean Water Act’s remedial purpose:
“Congress has explicitly stated that the objective of the [Act] ‘is to restore
169

See Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1982), quoted in United
States v. Plaza Health Labs., Inc., 3 F.3d 643, 647 (2d Cir. 1993).
170
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 752.
171
Id. at 755–56. See Smith, supra note 70, at 460 (“The Act bears the scars of years of
legislative wrangling and compromise . . . .”); Ky. Waterways Alliance, 2017 WL 6628917,
at *12.
172
See Or. Nat. Res. Ass’n, 550 F.3d at 784. As Professor Andreen memorably put the point,
“What was the EPA supposed to do, tell farmers how to farm?” William A. Andreen, Water
Quality Today—Has the Clean Water Act Been a Success?, 55 ALA. L. REV. 537, 562 (2004).
173
Solid Waste Ag. of N. Cook Cnty., 531 U.S. at 174.
174
See Jones, supra note 133, at 118 (arguing that “[a]pplication of ‘broad purposes’ of
legislation at the expense of specific provisions ignores the complexity of the problems
Congress is called upon to address,” and therefore rejecting a purpose-based justification
for direct Clean Water Act regulation of groundwater pollution) (quoting Bd. of Governors
of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 373–74 (1986)). Cf. Richard
A. Posner, Justice Breyer Throws Down the Gauntlet, 115 YALE L.J. 1699, 1710 (2006)
(noting that “the strongest argument against the purposive approach [is] that it tends to
override legislative compromises”).
175
N. Cal. River Watch, 2005 WL 2122052.
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and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.’ ”176
Step 2: Note that the aforementioned purpose would not be served
by regulating “a polluter who discharges pollutants via a pipe running from
the factory directly to the riverbank, but not a polluter who dumps the same
pollutants into a man-made settling basin some distance short of the river
and then allows the pollutants to seep into the river via the groundwater.”177
Answer: Yes, the Clean Water Act directly regulates groundwater
pollution, because such direct regulation would serve the Act’s purpose of
cleaning up the Nation’s waters.
This is an excellent purposivist analysis, so it should come as no surprise that its errors are precisely a function of its adherence to “that last
resort of extravagant interpretation.”178 A purpose-based analysis interprets statutory text in light of, and to effect, the statute’s purpose.179
That is where the error begins. As we have already seen, the Clean
Water Act does not embody a single “let’s clean up our water” purpose.180
Moreover, it is simply “a misunderstanding of the nature of lawmaking
in a democratic system to assume that each statute will, like a good work
of art, show forth consistent and well-developed themes.”181 Rather, laws
often are the product of “a delicate compromise among competing interests and concerns.”182 Putting it more bluntly, “reasonable people in the
legislature do not always produce reasonable results”; sometimes they
produce little more than “backroom deals.”183 Hence, trying to “interpret”
a statute exclusively according to “public-regarding rhetoric” often just
results in the “substitut[ion of] the judge’s conception of public policy for
that of the legislature.”184
Beyond these generally applicable concerns, a myopic purpose-based
theory of interpretation bodes particularly ill for the continuing vitality
of the Act’s federalism-infused distinction between point source and nonpoint source pollution. Again, one important way that the Clean Water
Act serves the purpose of maintaining state land-use authority as against
176

Id. at * 2 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)).
Id. at *2.
178
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 752.
179
See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 332–39 (1990).
180
See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 755–56 (plurality op.).
181
Damien M. Schiff, Purposivism and the “Reasonable Legislator”: A Review Essay of
Justice Stephen Breyer’s Active Liberty, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1081, 1091 (2007).
182
Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2000).
183
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 179, at 335.
184
Id.
177
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federal intrusion is through its regulatory limitation to point source
pollution.185 This kind of built-in statutory backstop is as much the
source of a law’s “purposes” as its express grants of authority.186 Yet the
same myopic purpose-based approach of, “if regulating it would help the
environment, then regulate it,” which ostensibly supports the conduit
theory, would impermissibly support regulation of pollution traditionally
thought of as nonpoint source.187 Put another way, construing the Clean
Water Act solely through the lens of environmental protection is bad
statutory interpretation, because that unqualified criterion did not motivate Congress. “Nonpoint sources discharge more pollutants than point
sources”188—they in fact “constitute[ ] a substantial portion of all water
pollution and significantly affect[ ] the quality of both surface water and
groundwater”189—but Congress chose to leave this problem to the states
to address.190
Perhaps recognizing the overreaching effects of wholesale acceptance of the conduit theory, EPA has attempted to limit the theory through
a directness requirement—only pollutant discharges that reach regulated surface waters through a “direct” groundwater connection trigger
liability.191 But there is no logically compelled way to distinguish between
185

Or. Nat. Desert Ass’n, 550 F.3d at 785; 26 Crown Assocs., 2017 WL 2960506, at *9.
Director, Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, Dep’t of Labor v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 514 U.S. 122, 136 (1995) (“Every statute proposes, not only to achieve
certain ends, but also to achieve them by particular means . . . . The withholding of agency
authority is as significant as the granting of it, and we have no right to play favorites
between the two.”).
187
See Miller, supra note 85, at 11147–48 (observing that much nonpoint source pollution
originates from vehicles, which comfortably fit within the definition of point source).
188
Id. at 11135.
189
David Zaring, Note, Agriculture, Nonpoint Source Pollution, and Regulatory Control: The
Clean Water Act’s Bleak Present and Future, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 515, 517 (1996).
190
See Miss. Comm’n on Nat. Res., 625 F.2d at 1275 (“[T]he legislative history reflects congressional concern that the Act not place in the hands of a federal administrator absolute
power over zoning watershed areas. The varied topographies and climates in the country call
for varied water quality solutions.”). See also Ky. Waterways Alliance, 2017 WL 6628917,
at *10.
191
See EPA Amicus Br., supra note 153, at 12 (“It has been EPA’s longstanding position
that discharges moving through groundwater to a jurisdictional surface water are subject
to CWA permitting requirements if there is a ‘direct hydrological connection’ between the
groundwater and the surface water.”). See also 66 Fed. Reg. at 3016 (“The Agency has
determined that discharges via hydrologically connected ground water impact surface
waters and, therefore, should be controlled at the source.”). EPA contends that the Second
Circuit upheld its “direct hydrological connection” theory in partially affirming the agency’s
effluent limitation guidelines for discharge permits issued to concentrated animal feeding
operations. See 73 Fed. Reg. at 70,420 (citing Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. EPA, 399 F.3d
186
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a direct and an indirect discharge if both discharges are to the same
groundwater aquifer and that aquifer discharges to a regulated surface
water, especially given that “ground and surface waters are connected”
and that “polluted groundwater will in most cases eventually discharge
to the surface.”192 Without such a method for determining liability, the
decision whether to regulate becomes an arbitrary line-drawing exercise,193 which typically is the province of the legislature not the judiciary
or the executive.194 Even if such a distinction could be formulated, its
implementation would be impracticable.195 And predicating liability based
on foreseeability—which seems to be the consideration underlying EPA’s
direct/indirect distinction—is a poor fit with the Clean Water Act’s strict
liability regime.196

486, 514–15 (2d Cir. 2005)). EPA’s reliance is misplaced. No one disputes that EPA may
take groundwater into account when superintending the NPDES permitting program; after
all, transfer of that power to the states is based on, among other things, a state’s having an
adequate program in place to deal with well (read: groundwater) pollution. See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(b)(1)(D). Moreover, no one disputes that the Act takes account of groundwater pollution—the question is how the Act does so. The indirect methods of funding and permitting
guidelines are consonant with a congressional desire to avoid direct federal regulation
of groundwater pollution.
192
Tripp & Jaffe, supra note 146, at 4.
193
The Clean Water Act’s legislative history reveals Congress’ awareness of the arbitrary
nature of the division in pollution regulation that it was enacting. See S. REP. NO. 92-414,
at 73 (“The Committee recognizes the essential link between ground and surface waters
and the artificial nature of any distinction.”).
194
See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 330 (2006)
(“[M]aking distinctions . . . where line-drawing is inherently complex, may call for a ‘far
more serious invasion of the legislative domain’ than we ought to undertake.”) (quoting
United States v. Treasury Employees, 513 U.S. 454, 479 n.26 (1995)); W. Va. CWP Fund
v. Stacy, 671 F.3d 378, 384 (4th Cir. 2011) (“[A] classic line-drawing exercise [falls]
uniquely within the competence of the legislative branch.”).
195
Hayman, supra note 137, at 122 (“[I]n general, the directness of hydrologic connection
is far more obtuse and difficult either to demonstrate or to disprove.”).
196
Stoddard v. W. Carolina Regional Sewer Auth., 784 F.2d 1200, 1208 (4th Cir. 1986) (“Liability under the Clean Water Act is a form of strict liability.”). Cf. David P. Griffith, Note,
Products Liability—Negligence Presumed: An Evolution, 67 TEX. L. REV. 851, 854 (1989)
(“Strict liability . . . dispos[es] of foreseeability . . . .”). It is plausible that injunctive relief may
be available to restrain the foreseeable and imminent addition of pollutants to regulated
surface waters. See Drelich, supra note 36, at 287–88 (citing, inter alia, Milwaukee v. Ill.,
451 U.S. 304 (1981)). But that possibility does not support the regulation of groundwater pollution, if I am correct that should be considered nonpoint source pollution. For even advocates of expansive direct Clean Water Act liability—such as Mr. Drelich—presumably would
agree that the Act provides no authority to restrain a foreseeable addition of nonpoint
source pollution.
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Adding a traceability requirement to conduit-theory liability for
“direct” groundwater-carried discharges, as some courts have done,197
actually worsens rather than moderates the interpretive error. Whether
a pollutant that has reached regulated waters is traceable to a given point
source is a question of trying to pin an already existing liability on the
right actor, as opposed to determining whether liability exists in the first
place.198 In other words, the inability to trace the pollutant back to a
particular point source does not mean that no liability has been incurred,
but rather that such liability likely cannot be proved. But weighing the
difficulty in establishing liability is a quintessentially prosecutorial not
judicial function.199 Thus, the conduit theory improperly collapses two
conceptually distinct issues: the standard of liability, and likelihood of
establishing that standard in any given case.200
CONCLUSION
In the spirit of cooperative federalism, Congress left the problem
of nonpoint source pollution to the states. In the preceding pages, I have endeavored to show that direct federal regulation of discharges to groundwater—the consequence of judicial adoption of the “conduit” or related
theories—would upset this careful legislative compromise.
The courts that have concluded otherwise all appear to adhere—
whether explicitly or not—to a purpose-based interpretive approach to
support direct federal regulation, one which I sketched out in the preceding section. Such an interpretation produces what I have elsewhere
called “interpretive creep,” i.e., the process of construing particular provisions of a statute in light of its supposed purpose such that, after a series
of interpretations, the statute begins to take more and more the view of
only one faction of the legislature that helped to enact it.201 Such a
197

See, e.g., Tenn. Clean Water Act Network, 2017 WL 3476069, at *43.
Cf. Miller, supra note 85, at 11132 (“[T]he definition of point source does not mention or
suggest traceability.”).
199
Cf. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (noting that prosecutorial discretion
is a function of, among other factors, “the strength of the case”).
200
By asking the courts to assume that task, the traceability limitation invites the judiciary
to exceed its proper role. Cf. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 680–81 (1988) (observing
that “one purpose of the broad prohibition upon the courts’ exercise of ‘executive or administrative duties of a nonjudicial nature,’ ” is to ensure that “judges do not encroach upon
executive or legislative authority or undertake tasks that are more properly accomplished
by those branches”) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 123 (1976)).
201
Schiff, supra note 181, at 1091–92.
198
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phenomenon is frequently seen in environmental law, perhaps because
people—judges, politicians, and even businessmen included—generally
harbor favorable views of environmental protection.202
Given these unspoken prejudices, coupled with the force of interpretive creep, a query would naturally arise in the courts that have followed
the above-described purposivist interpretive theory: Why, after all, wouldn’t
Congress want groundwater pollution to be cleaned up?203 Unavoidably,
this line of inquiry leads to the wrong result because it asks the wrong
question. It impliedly denies the existence of other or competing purposes—if there are no other purposes than environmental protection, then
it may well follow that Congress would have had no good reason to decline
to directly regulate groundwater pollution. The analysis depends on the
counterfactual that the Act has no other purpose than environmental
protection à l’outrance.
More importantly, the purposivist analysis is misguided because
it is exclusively concerned with ends (getting rid of water pollution). That
is problematic because a statute is not just about ends—it is also about the
means chosen to achieve those ends.204 Congress quite reasonably can
choose not to select certain means for a variety of reasons, e.g., economic
costs, tradition, or political controversy. To find such choosiness over means
in the Clean Water Act should not be surprising at all, given the statute’s
express policy to protect the states’ land-use authority.205 Thus, a question

202

Environmental law “came from a public awareness so spontaneous and deep that within
a few short years, it had produced over a dozen major public welfare laws and more than
twenty new federal programs.” Houck, Standing on the Wrong Foot, supra note 50, at 15.
Importantly, these new laws—including the Clean Water Act—“were largely bi-partisan,
and . . . . received overwhelming votes in [their] favor.” Id. It should not come as a surprise,
then, that “it is now bad politics to be considered anti-environment, [as well as] bad business
for a company to conduct its operations without considering environmental impacts.” Mark
A. Stach, The Gradual Reform of Environmental Law in the Twenty-First Century: Opportunities Within a Familiar Framework, 22 J. CORP. L. 621, 623 (1997). Environmental law also
quickly became exceedingly popular in law school, shaping the views of decades-worth of
judges. See David Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness of
Administrative Law, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 613 (1970) (“The popularity of environmental
law seminars overwhelms their instructors.”).
203
As my exemplar district court observed, “it would hardly make sense” to regulate the
direct discharger but not the groundwater-to-surface-water discharger. N. Cal. River
Watch, 2005 WL 2122052, at *2. Of course, it’s not quite fair to fault a certain legislative
distinction for bearing no rational connection to one purpose, where, as with the Clean
Water Act, a statute serves more than one purpose.
204
See Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, Dep’t of Labor, 514 U.S. at 136.
205
See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b).
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better tailored to good statutory interpretation would be, why would
Congress choose not to regulate groundwater pollution? The answer lies
in the cooperative framework that animates the Clean Water Act,206 one
according to which primary responsibility for remedying groundwater
pollution is assigned to the states. Perhaps that framework was then or
is now ill-judged.207 If so, then it falls to Congress—not private litigants
or the courts—to recalibrate the Act’s federal-state balance.
EPILOGUE
Shortly before this Article went to press, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled in Hawai’i Wildlife Fund v. County
of Maui208 that Clean Water Act liability attaches to point-source discharges of pollutants that reach jurisdictional waters through groundwater, if the pollution is more than de minimis and is “fairly traceable” to the
point source.209 The court’s very liability-friendly standard shares many
of the shortcomings associated with the conduit theory, discussed supra
Section II.C, perhaps most notably the failure to preserve any meaningful distinction between point-source and nonpoint-source pollution.
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See Ark. v. Okla., 503 U.S. at 101.
See, e.g., Terence J. Centner, Nutrient Pollution from Land Applications of Manure: Discerning a Remedy for Pollution, 21 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 213, 225 (2010) (“States have
provisions concerning nonpoint source pollution, but state efforts have not been very
successful in precluding nonpoint source pollution.”); Ky. Waterways Alliance, 2017 WL
6628917, at *12 (“Indeed, the distinction between point-and non-point sources would
appear untenable in light of this purpose [of protecting surface water quality], given that
‘non[-]point sources of pollution constitute a major source of pollution in the nation’s
waters.’ ”) (quoting Or. Nat’l Res. Council, 834 F.2d at 849).
208
No. 15-17447, 2018 WL 650973 (9th Cir. Feb. 1, 2018).
209
Id. at *7.
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